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Abstract 
In recent years, on the norms of audit fees and regulations introduced one after another, the Chinese Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants issued a resolutely crack down on and control of the CPA industry unfair 
competition behavior notice .The introduction of this series of policies, on the one hand shows that the 
Government attaches importance to the issue of audit fees, on the other hand also revealed the existence of real 
fees in the phenomenon of non-standard, urgent need of governance. So, what is the status quo of the structure of 
the audit market, and whether it is effective? Whether the audit market behavior (audit pricing) is reasonable? 
For the current situation of China's transition economy is very different from the audit market environment in 
developed countries, I myself and the social stakeholders have a lot to do in this industry. This paper shows that 
the audit market structure has some improvement, the audit market structure of the impact of audit pricing is 
very significant. 
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1.Introduction 
As early as in 2007, for our local offices, the AICPA specifically developed a "bigger and stronger" and 
"opinions"1. In the accounting firm "National Chess", the overall quality of the industry under the premise of the 
"views" put forward the overall objective, first of all within a decade to develop 100 or so, can provide 
comprehensive services for large-scale accounting firms; Support 10 or so of the international firm, so that 
China's enterprises in the process of internationalization to provide the appropriate integrated services. 
At the same time, in recent years, on the norms of audit fees and regulations introduced in series; the 
Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants issued a resolutely crack down on and control of the CPA 
industry unfair competition behavior notice2. The introduction of this series of policies, on the one hand shows 
that the Government attaches importance to the issue of audit fees, on the other hand also revealed the existence 
of real fees in the phenomenon of non-standard, urgent need of governance. So, what is the status quo of the 
structure of the audit market? Is it effective? What is the status quo of the development of local accounting firms? 
Audit market behavior (audit pricing) is reasonable? Audit market structure of the audit market structure What is 
the impact of audit pricing? Is the need to focus on and seriously study the important issues. 
Zeff and Fossum (1967) is a pioneer in the study of audit market structure, and the research on audit 
market structure has been a long time in foreign research. The research perspective from the beginning of the use 
of Bain's market structure theory of industry concentration (CRn) on the audit industry to measure the market 
structure, and gradually developed to measure the audit market structure of the other elements, such as: 
accounting firm size , Industry expertise, reputation mechanisms, and entry and exit walls. Simunic et al. (1980) 
examined the different accounting firms in the auditing market by empirical methods, and whether their market 
share is stable, in order to verify the relationship between the high concentration of the audit market and the 
restriction of competition by monopoly. 
The domestic scholars have rich research results on the market concentration and price competition, 
mainly from the audit market concentration, the audit market structure and the accounting firm merger on the 
audit pricing, audit fees and market performance and other aspects of the study. Lu Lu (2011) using the 2009-
2010 China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market data, the use of multiple regression analysis of the impact of 
market structure on the audit price. Li Minghui, Zhang Juan and Liu Xiaoxia (2012) showed that audit fees 
increased significantly after the merger of these accounting firms, and the first year after the merger was more 
obvious than the second year. 
The research on auditing market structure and audit pricing in domestic and abroad is expatiated in this 
paper, but it is hard to exhaust every detail. This paper summarizes and analyzes the three aspects of the audit 
market structure and the audit pricing. It is found that the domestic research has lagged behind the foreign 
research. This is largely because China is a developing country and the capital market is not perfect. 
                                                 
1 "Association of Certified Public Accountants of China to promote the accounting firm; bigger and stronger views" of the 
notice; Association [2007] No. 33 
2 "The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants on resolutely crack down on and control of the CPA industry unfair 
competition behavior"; Association [2012] 58 
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2. Research design 
2.1 Sample selection and data sources 
In this chapter, the auditing market structure and the audit fees are selected. In view of its transparency and 
availability, this paper chooses the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares as the research object. Taking into account 
the 2000-2008 on China's audit market structure of the relevant research results are more abundant, and since 
2008 most of the research for the audit market structure of a particular aspect, so this chapter focuses on China's 
2009-2014 database. In the case of sample selection, taking into account the heterogeneity of the financial and 
insurance listed companies data, so the annual "financial, insurance," the sample observations, while excluding 
audit fees, total customer assets such as incomplete data disclosure Observed values. In the sectoral division of 
industry expertise, this chapter, according to the SFC industry classification method, in addition to the financial 
and insurance industry in addition to a total of 12 sectors of the sample observations. In this chapter, we obtain 
the annual observations of 9839 sample companies. The distribution of the samples is shown in Table 2.1. Data 
processing and statistical analysis in this chapter are done with excel2013 and Stata11.0. 
Table 2.1 Sample Annual Distribution Table 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Number of Firms 1128 1278 1440 1675 1949 2369 
Proportion 11.46 12.99 14.64 17.02 19.81 24.08 
 
2.2 Variable definition 
(1) The explanatory variables 
Since the empirical part of this chapter is the test of the audit pricing, it is still the classic method of simunic 
(1980), the explanatory variable audit pricing is still measured by the natural logarithm (LNFEE) of the audit 
fees of listed companies. 
(2) Explain the variables 
? market concentration 
This chapter chooses CRxn as the indicator of market share of CPA firms. Where CRxn represents the firm's 
share of the total audit market in year n. This chapter chooses CRxn as the indicator of market share of CPA 
firms. Where CRxn represents the firm's share of the total audit market in year n. Using the customer's total 
assets, the customer's operating income, audit fees, the weighted average of these three indicators (assuming the 
importance of the same three, the weights are 1/3) as a measure. The calculation formula is: 
CR=Xj/ΣNm=1Xm 
Where Xj is the X resource occupied by firm j, and N is the total number of firms. Where X resource is the 
weighted average of the above three indicators. 
? industry expertise 
In this paper, the market share method is used to measure the industry's expertise. In this industry, if the 
accounting firm's market share in the industry reaches a certain percentage, and this proportion is higher, it 
indicates that the accounting firm The industry in which the industry has more expertise. It is calculated as 
follows: 
SPECik=Σjikj=1RijkΣiki=1Σjkj=1Rijk 
In the formula, the molecular part represents the accounting firm in a particular industry in the audit of its 
customers related indicators, this indicator contains many items, can be: the total assets of audited customers, 
operating income, audit fees; Represents the total amount of all audited customer-related metrics in this 
particular industry. 
? barriers to entry 
The barriers to entry are related to firm size, so this paper takes 
Barrijt=lnXijt 
Where: Barr said barriers 
Xijt represents the size of the assets of accountant i in year t 
(3) control variables 
Based on previous studies, this paper chooses the following variables which have significant influence on audit 
pricing as control variables: 
? The complexity of the audited customers (REIN) 
REIN = (Accounts receivable at the end of the period - Ending inventory) / total assets 
? Financial status (LEV) 
? The audited customer scale (LNASSET) 
? Audit Opinion Type (OPINION) 
? whether ST (ST) 
? listed companies in the region (REGION) 
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2.3 empirical model set 
In this paper, simunic (1980) model, the model is as follows: 
(1)LNFEE = ao + a1 CR + a2 REIN + a3LEV + a4 LNASSET + a5OPINION + a6ST + a7 REGION + e 
(2)LNFEE = ao + ai SPEC + a2 REIN + a3LEV + a4 LNASSET + a5OPINION + a6ST + a7 REGION + e 
(3)LNFEE = a0 + a1 BARR + a2 REIN + a3LE + a4OPINION + a5ST + a6 REGION + e 
Model (1) is used to test the effect of audit market concentration on audit pricing under different control 
conditions. 
Model (2) is used to test the impact of accounting firm's industry expertise on audit pricing under different 
control conditions. 
Model (3) is used to examine the impact of entry barriers on audit pricing under different control conditions. 
 
3. Empirical results and analysis 
From Table 3.1 we can see that, first, the audit fee variable, Infee (audit fees natural logarithm) mean 13.27, the 
maximum value of 17.52, the minimum value of 9.210, which shows that the audit fees of listed companies is 
not much difference (The ratio of the audit fee to the square root of the total assets of the audited client) is 12.97, 
which is comparable to Infee, but the maximum and the minimum are very large and the standard deviation is as 
high as 26.35, which is mainly due to the total assets of the audited customers. Differences caused. Second, the 
audit market structure of the variables, cr (audit market concentration) maximum of 0.170, the minimum is less 
than 0.0000, indicating that China's accounting firms in the audit market share of the market share gap is very 
large; but the standard deviation For the 0.00269 point of view, the audit market competition in the accounting 
firm more balanced. Accounting firms accounted for 9.32% of the total sample, although the proportion was not 
significant, but compared with the results of the research (8.92%) by Lulu (2011), it shows that China's 
accounting firms' professional expertise (accounting expertise) Of the accounting firm's industry expertise has 
improved. From barr, the maximum and minimum values are 27.39 and 10.84 respectively. The difference is not 
significant, the mean value is 21.74, which indicates that China's current entry barriers are improving. Finally, 
the control variables, rein (customer complexity) the maximum value of 0.945, the minimum value of 0, 
indicating that the complexity of the audited customers vary greatly, so the requirements of the accounting firm 
is different, thus affecting the audit fees . Lev (asset-liability ratio) and rein (customer complexity) similar to the 
difference is great. From the opinion type (opinion type) and st (whether ST), the two cases are similar, the mean 
were: 0.0530 and 0.0288, standard deviation, respectively: 0.224 and 0.167, indicating the audit market was 
issued non-standard audit opinion and The number of companies listed as ST is quite large. However, after 
further statistics, we find that there is not a one-to-one relationship between listed companies that issue non-
standard audit opinions and those listed as STs. From the regional perspective, the listed companies in the 
economically developed regions account for 65.7% of the total number of A-share securities companies. 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of the study variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
LNFEE 9839 13.27 0.629 9.210 17.52 
FEEPER 9839 12.97 26.35 0.112 2432 
CR 9839 0.000610 0.00269 4.73e-08 0.170 
SPEC 9839 0.0932 0.291 0 1 
BARR 9839 21.74 1.304 10.84 27.39 
LEV 9839 0.559 2.106 -0.195 142.7 
ST 9839 0.0288 0.167 0 1 
OPINION 9839 0.0530 0.224 0 1 
REGION 9839 0.657 0.475 0 1 
REIN 9839 0.270 0.181 0 0.945 
LNASSET 9839 21.74 1.304 10.84 27.39 
 
3.1 Multivariate regression analysis 
Table 3.2 reports the regression results of the model (1), (2), (3), which represent the audit market concentration 
of the audit market structure, the accounting firm's industry expertise, and the entry into the market, respectively, 
on the impact of audit pricing. : Cr (audit market concentration) is positively correlated with Infee (the natural 
logarithm of audit fees) (P-value <0.01), and R2 of model (1) is 0.5102, which reflects that the model fit well ; 
The measured DW test value is 1.987, thus deduced that the model does not exist first-order autocorrelation; 
shows that the higher the audit market concentration, the higher the audit fees. (P-vahie <0.01), and the R2 of the 
model (2) is 0.5001, which indicates that the fitting effect of the model is very good. The empirical results show 
that the model has a significant positive correlation with the empirical logarithm of audit fees, ; The measured 
DW test value is 1.982, thus deduced that the model does not exist first-order autocorrelation; it means that those 
accounting firms with industry expertise will get audit fees premium. (P-value <0.01), and the R2 of the model 
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(3) is 0.4933, which reflects that the fitting effect of the model is very good; And the DW test value is 1.957. It is 
concluded that there is no first-order autocorrelation of the model, which indicates that the audit fee will increase 
with the increase of the entrance ridge. Rein (customer complexity) are significantly positive, indicating that the 
more complex the audited customers, the higher the audit fees charged by accounting firms. Lev (asset-liability 
ratio) of the coefficients are positive and significant, indicating that the higher the asset-liability ratio, the greater 
the risk of business, accounting firm audit fees charged higher. The coefficient of Inasset in model (1), (2) is 
significantly positive, indicating that the larger the audited customer, the higher the audit fees charged by the 
accounting firm. The coefficient of opinion is significantly positive, indicating that the higher the audit fees the 
auditor will receive when the auditee is issued a non - standard opinion. St (ST) in the model (1) (2) (3), the 
coefficients are positive and are not significant, indicating that St (whether ST) this factor on the audit pricing is 
weak. The coefficients of regional factors are significantly positive, indicating that the audited clients are in 
economically developed areas, the higher the audit fees charged by accounting firms. Through the above analysis, 
assuming that one, two, three are tested. There are significant positive correlations between auditing market 
concentration, auditing firm 's industry specialty and entry price, and audit pricing. 
Table 3.2 Multiple Linear Regression Results (LNFEE) 
   (1) (2) (3) 
 LNFEE LNFEE LNFEE 
CR 33.89***   
 (18.43)   
SPEC  0.186***  
  (11.53)  
BARR   0.338*** 
   (92.98) 
LEV 0.0245*** 0.0256*** 0.0265*** 
 (11.30) (11.68) (12.06) 
REIN 0.103*** 0.0965*** 0.114*** 
 (4.16) (3.85) (4.53) 
LNASSET 0.307*** 0.329***  
 (77.32) (88.95)  
ST 0.0346 0.0379 0.0357 
 (1.28) (1.39) (1.30) 
REGION 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.164*** 
 (16.70) (16.61) (17.05) 
OPINION 0.216*** 0.235*** 0.243*** 
 (10.23) (11.03) (11.33) 
Year Control Control Control 
_cons 6.399*** 5.933*** 5.748*** 
 (74.20) (73.17) (71.84) 
N 9839 9839 9839 
F 853.06 819.07 869.75 
R2 0.5102 0.5001  0.4933 
    
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
3.2 Sensitivity analysis 
(1) To change the method of calculating the explanatory variables 
(1980) used PEE / ASSETS *, FEE / ASSETS ^ 0.5, and FEE / ASSETS ^ 1/3 as explanatory variables to test 
the impact of other factors on audit pricing. The study shows that FSE / ASSETS ^ 0.5 is the explanatory 
variable , The best test results. Therefore, we choose FEE / ASSETS ^ 0.5 as the explanatory variable and 
perform regression. Table 3.3 reports the results of the audit market structure's impact on the audit pricing as 
measured by FEE / ASSETS ^ 0.5. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between audit 
market concentration and audit firm's industry expertise and audit pricing, And the audit pricing has positive 
correlation, once again verify the conclusions of this chapter. 
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Table 3.3 Multiple Linear Regression Results (ASSETS ^ 0.5) 
   (1) (2) (3) 
 FEEPER FEEPER FEEPER 
CR 664.8***   
 (9.01)   
SPEC  1.986**  
  (3.09)  
BARR   -2.426*** 
   (-16.83) 
LEV 8.946*** 8.976*** 8.987*** 
 (102.93) (102.96) (103.12) 
REIN -3.797*** -3.826*** -4.014*** 
 (-3.82) (-3.83) (-4.02) 
LNASSET -3.046*** -2.524***  
 (-19.13) (-17.11)  
ST 4.360*** 4.405*** 4.382*** 
 (4.03) (4.06) (4.03) 
REGION 1.893*** 1.956*** 2.011*** 
 (4.99) (5.13) (5.28) 
OPINION -4.679*** -4.239*** -4.154*** 
 (-5.51) (-4.99) (-4.89) 
Year Control Control Control 
_cons 72.60*** 61.79*** 59.81*** 
 (20.98) (19.12) (18.87) 
N 9839 9839 9839 
F 1003.11 989.94 1078.13 
R2 0.5506 0.5473 0.5469 
    
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(2) Shrink tail processing 
We conducted the tail-cutting on the audit fees, the audit market concentration, the access to the wall-wide, the 
complexity of the audited customers, the asset-liability ratio and the size of the audited customers at the 1% and 
99% level, The results are shown in Table 3.4. The audit market concentration, the accounting firm's industry 
expertise, and the entry barrier represent significant positive correlations with the audit pricing. Therefore, the 
conclusions in Table 3.1 are still valid. 
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Table 3.4 Multiple regression analysis results (winsorized treatment) 
   (1) (2) (3) 
 LNFEE_w LNFEE_w LNFEE_w 
CR_w 157.0***   
 (26.57)   
SPEC  0.169***  
  (11.12)  
BARR_w   0.325*** 
   (84.44) 
LEV_w 0.0724*** 0.0720*** 0.0723*** 
 (3.62) (3.49) (3.49) 
REIN_w -0.102*** -0.114*** -0.130*** 
 (-4.23) (-4.59) (-5.21) 
LNASSET_w 0.231*** 0.317***  
 (45.02) (81.31)  
ST 0.0226 0.0239 0.0220 
 (0.90) (0.92) (0.84) 
REGION 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.161*** 
 (17.60) (17.10) (17.53) 
OPINION 0.129*** 0.184*** 0.191*** 
 (6.00) (8.37) (8.63) 
Year Control Control Control 
_cons 7.936*** 6.179*** 6.014*** 
 (74.29) (75.18) (73.94) 
N 9839 9839 9839 
F  911.27 815.65 867.73 
R2 0.5267  0.4990 0.4927 
    
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
4 .Conclusions and recommendations 
This paper analyzes the impact of China's audit market structure on audit market behavior (audit pricing) based 
on the theoretical basis of the SCP analysis framework and the contestable market theory of industrial 
organization theory. This paper shows that the audit market structure has some improvement, the audit market 
structure of the impact of audit pricing is very significant. 
The paper examines the correlation between the audit market structure and the audit pricing in China's 
A-share listed companies in the audit market from 2009 to 2014. The results show that, after controlling the 
influence of other variables, the three factors of the audit market structure are significantly positively related to 
the audit fees. Among them, the audit market concentration, the firm's industry expertise and audit fees are 
significantly positively correlated. This fully shows that through the "bigger and stronger" path is to improve 
audit fees, improve the audit market in the case of unfair low-price competition. This also reflects the CPA 
associations and other departments since 2007 to carry out a series of encourage and promote the accounting 
firm "bigger and stronger" measures have achieved some success. However, this paper is not limited in depth 
analysis of the international "Big Four" and the differences between local accounting firms, audit market 
structure of the strengths and weaknesses of the various factors; failed to fully measure the accounting firm 
industry expertise, 2006-2009, Strong combination "on the impact of audit pricing, etc., these are still to be 
further studied. 
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